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Chapter 11

Language Accommodation and
The Voting Rights Act
Angelo N. Ancheta
Santa Clara University School of Law

Introduction
In United States v. City of Boston, a federal district court approved a settlement
agreement between the U.S. Department of Justice and the city of Boston that
spotlighted overt discrimination against minority voters and the importance of
providing language assistance to those voters—not only as a congressional remedy for past discrimination but as a vehicle for increasing civic engagement and
political participation. The Justice Department had alleged that the city of Boston had violated Section 2031 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965—the act’s major
language-assistance provision—by failing to provide adequate translation of
election materials in Spanish and by failing to recruit, appoint, train, and maintain an adequate pool of bilingual poll workers.2 In addition, the complaint alleged that the city had violated Section 2, the act’s general antidiscrimination
provision, and other sections of the law in a variety of ways: by treating limitedEnglish-proficient Latino and Asian-American voters disrespectfully; by refusing to permit these voters to be aided by an assistor of their choice; by improperly influencing, coercing, or ignoring the voters’ ballot choices; by failing to
make bilingual personnel available to the voters; and by refusing or failing to
provide provisional ballots.3
1

42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a.
Complaint, United States v. City of Boston, No. 05–11598 WGY (D. Mass. July
29, 2005).
3
Id.
2

1
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Typical of recent cases, the order in United States v. City of Boston requires
improved translations of election materials, an adequate supply of bilingual poll
workers, greater dissemination of multilingual information, federal election monitoring, the designation of a language-assistance coordinator, and the creation of a
community-based advisory body.4 The case is noteworthy, however, because the
order extended language-based remedies for Section 2 violations to groups of voters that were not explicitly covered by Section 203’s protections. Although the
Latino population in Boston was large enough to trigger Section 203 coverage, the
populations of limited-English-proficient Chinese Americans and Vietnamese
Americans each fell below the statistical thresholds necessary to invoke Section
203.5 As remedies for violations of Section 2, the mandates in City of Boston illustrate the central role that language assistance can play in redressing discrimination
against limited-English-proficient voters, even if those voters do not constitute a
large enough population to invoke formal coverage under Section 203.
Cases such as United States v. City of Boston illuminate an important trend in
voting rights law, one in which language assistance is not simply a structural remedy bound by the four corners of the act, but a vehicle designed more broadly to
accommodate differences among minority voters and to promote meaningful access to the political process. In other recent cases, the Justice Department has obtained settlements that have required language assistance to groups falling below
the statistical benchmarks for Section 203 coverage,6 as well as to groups that are
not covered by Section 203, such as Arab Americans.7 Moreover, voluntary assistance to noncovered groups has become increasingly common in major cities with
growing immigrant populations. The Chicago Election Board, for example, is required under Section 203 to provide language assistance in Spanish and Chinese,
but also provides voluntary assistance in languages such as Polish, Russian, Greek,
German, Korean, and Serbian.8 And the city of Boston, notwithstanding the Justice Department’s 2005 lawsuit, had already made commitments to provide voter
materials in Spanish, Haitian Creole, Vietnamese, Cape Verdean Creole, Portuguese, Chinese, and Russian.9
4

United States v. City of Boston, No. 05–11598 WGY (D. Mass. Oct. 18, 2005)
(three-judge court).
5
Chinese-American voting age citizens in Boston numbered 9,825, while Vietnamese-American voting age citizens numbered 4,220. See Complaint, United States v. City
of Boston, supra note 2, at ¶ 10.
6
See Memorandum of Agreement, United States v. San Diego County, No.
04CV1273JEG (S.D. Cal. 2004) ¶ 26 (requiring language assistance in Vietnamese where
population numbers fell just below 10,000).
7
See United States v. City of Hamtramck, No. 00–73541(E.D. Mich. Aug. 7, 2000)
(requiring language assistance in Arabic and Bengali as a remedy for voter intimidation
and harassment).
8
See http://www.chicagoelections.com/table_of_contents.htm (last visited Sept. 13,
2006).
9
See http://www.cityofboston.gov/newbostonians/voterkit.asp (last visited Sept. 13,
2006).
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Yet moving beyond a strictly remedial basis for language assistance under the
Voting Rights Act raises significant political and constitutional questions. Political
support for language assistance in voting is hardly universal. Arguments for English-only elections to limit financial costs and to underscore the role of English as
a civic lingua franca continue to animate opposition to language assistance under
the act. Indeed, there have been numerous attempts in recent years to repeal the
act’s language assistance provisions, including a proposed amendment in 2006 to
H.R. 9, the bill that reauthorized the language assistance provisions for an additional twenty-five years.10 Moreover, recent U.S. Supreme Court cases have limited the scope of congressional power to remedy constitutional and civil rights
violations committed by state governments and have made antidiscrimination litigation increasingly problematic. Without a strong evidentiary record to justify
congressional action, legislation designed to enforce guarantees of equality under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments may be constitutionally suspect.
This chapter examines the expansion of language assistance under the Voting
Rights Act from a structural remedy for past discrimination to a broader vehicle of
language accommodation that encourages political participation by limitedEnglish-proficient voters. Part I of the chapter examines various antidiscrimination
models under the Voting Rights Act, including Section 203 and the act’s more
general civil rights protections for limited-English-proficient voters. Part II offers
a model of language accommodation that expands current voting rights jurisprudence, drawing on legal theories of language rights and extant antidiscrimination
standards outside of voting. Part III suggests a framework for incorporating language-accommodation norms into enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, as well
as additional vehicles for protecting language rights, such as Title VI of the Civil
Rights of 1964 and election laws such as the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

I. Language Minorities and the Voting Rights Act
To trace the growth of language assistance from its roots as a structural antidiscrimination remedy to an evolving norm of language accommodation, this section discusses various language-assistance mandates under the Voting Rights
Act. Section 203 of the act is the primary federal mandate requiring assistance to
language minorities, but other provisions of the Voting Rights Act provide addi10

In July of 2006, during floor votes on the reauthorization of the Voting Rights
Act, the House of Representatives defeated, by a vote of 238–185, an amendment offered
by Representative Steve King to H.R. 9 that would have eliminated Section 203 of the
Voting Rights Act. See http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/109/house/2/votes/
372/ Similarly, in August of 1996, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 123, the
“Bill Emerson English Language Empowerment Act of 1996,” which would have declared English to be the official language of the United States and would have repealed
the language assistance provisions of the Voting Rights Act. See http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/query/z?c104:H.R.123: The Senate did not vote on the bill.
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tional, but underutilized, bases for protecting the rights of limited-Englishproficient voters. The various protections also represent significantly different
models of civil rights enforcement. Language assistance provisions such as Section 203 typify a structural remediation model of voting rights law that addresses past discrimination against identified groups. Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, which has covered language minorities since 1975, typifies the traditional antidiscrimination model found in many civil rights laws prohibiting
policies of differential treatment and disparate impact against minorities. Finally, Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act, a provision added in 1982 to improve electoral access to disabled and illiterate voters, typifies an individual
accommodation model that has gained strength in recent years in civil rights
enforcement affecting the physically or mentally disabled. Although complementary, the combination of these models nonetheless fails to offer a systematic
approach that fully addresses the rights of limited-English-proficient voters.

A. Language Minorities and the 1975 Amendments
By expanding the reach and requirements of the original Voting Rights Act
to include language minorities, the 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act
were designed to promote two major goals. One goal was to clarify the act’s
coverage of certain racial and ethnic minorities—Latinos in particular—who had
suffered discrimination in the political process, but whose group status under the
law remained uncertain. Defining the “Hispanic” or “Latino” population was
problematic under the original act because its members, by self-designation or
by ascription, often eluded clear racial categorization and transcended strict racial labels such as “black” and “white.” The “language minority” category was
created to ensure full voting rights protections for individuals of “Spanish heritage,” as well as for American Indians, Asian Americans, and Alaska Natives.11
11

42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(3); id. § 1973aa-1a(e). The legislative history of the 1975
amendments also reveals a clear congressional intent to expand the act’s coverage beyond
black-white racial discrimination. See S. Rep. No. 94–295, at 35–37 (1975), reprinted in
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 802–04. Although groups such as Asian Americans would have
been considered racial groups even under the 1965 act, their addition through the language-minority amendments, along with the addition of Latinos and Native Americans,
was grounded in both the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantees and the
Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibitions on racial discrimination in voting. Congress relied
on equal protection doctrine, under which the courts had already recognized that classifications based on national origin, like racial classifications, were presumptively unconstitutional, as the basis for extending the act to categories that eluded definition based on
racial criteria, but were nonetheless the basis for extensive discrimination. See Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 197 (1973); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477–79
(1954). However, Congress’s choice to employ “language minority” status, rather than a
broader and more commonly used category such as “national origin” or “ethnicity,” ef-
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Congress amended the Voting Rights Act to incorporate the language minority
categories in a manner that ensured that the act’s Section 5 preclearance requirements extended to language minority populations.12 Congress also amended
Section 2, the general and permanent antidiscrimination provision of the act, to
add coverage for language minorities.13
A second goal of the 1975 amendments was to establish a set of structural
remedies to address both past and ongoing discrimination against limited-Englishproficient minorities.14 Congress determined that educational discrimination, including overt segregation and disparities in public school funding and resource
allocations, had led to high rates of illiteracy among language minorities throughout the country.15 These educational inequalities, combined with discrimination

fectively limited the act’s coverage to the enumerated groups, excluding other groups that
might have been covered under a category defined differently.
12
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f). Section 5 requires state and local governments with an extensive history of discrimination that has resulted in depressed minority political participation to “preclear” any changes to their electoral procedures either through administrative review by the Department of Justice or a declaratory judgment by a three-judge panel
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. A change must have neither a
discriminatory purpose nor a discriminatory effect. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Moreover, the
act’s ban on the use of a voting “test or device” was extended to ban English-only procedures for elections where a language-minority group constitutes over 5% of the voting
age population. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(3).
13
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).
14
Section 4(e) of the original Act had already recognized the connection between
English-language-proficiency and voting discrimination in the case of Puerto Rican voters, many of whom had been educated in Spanish-dominant educational environments;
the act prohibits English-only literacy tests for “persons educated in American-flag
schools in which the predominant classroom language was other than English.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b(e). The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 4(e) in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
15
Section 4(f)(1) states:
The Congress finds that voting discrimination against citizens of language minorities is pervasive and national in scope. Such minority citizens are from environments in which the dominant language is other than English. In addition they
have been denied equal educational opportunities by State and local governments,
resulting in severe disabilities and continuing illiteracy in the English language.
The Congress further finds that, where State and local officials conduct elections
only in English, language minority citizens are excluded from participating in the
electoral process. In many areas of the country, this exclusion is aggravated by
acts of physical, economic, and political intimidation. The Congress declares that,
in order to enforce the guarantees of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution, it is necessary to eliminate such discrimination by
prohibiting English-only elections, and by prescribing other remedial devices.

42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(1). In addition, Section 203(a) states:
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and intimidation in the electoral process, produced low rates of voter registration
and voting among language-minority groups.16 Congress thus recognized the denial of voting rights inherent in many English-only election procedures and created two remedial vehicles requiring translated election materials, oral interpretation and aid, and other language-sensitive assistance: Section 4(f) and Section 203.
Because Congress found nationwide discrimination affecting language minorities,
neither of the provisions requires proof of intentional discrimination or discriminatory effect by a local jurisdiction; implementation requires only that the jurisdiction satisfy the appropriate triggering formula.
Section 4(f), which targets a limited number of jurisdictions with long histories of discrimination, prohibits English-only materials and requires language assistance in areas that satisfy a triggering formula that combines a languageminority group’s size (over 5%), the use of English-only procedures, and low
voter registration and turnout.17 Under Section 203, which applies nationwide, a
variety of triggering formulas assess minority group size and high rates of illiteracy (measured by educational completion below the fifth grade) to determine language-assistance coverage. As originally enacted and as amended in 1982, Section
203 mandates language assistance in a state or political subdivision in which more
than 5% of the voting-age citizens are members of a language-minority group and
are limited-English-proficient, and where the illiteracy rate for that group exceeds
the national illiteracy rate.18 To address the problem of excluding coverage for

The Congress finds that, through the use of various practices and procedures, citizens of language minorities have been effectively excluded from participation in
the electoral process. Among other factors, the denial of the right to vote of such
minority group citizens is ordinarily directly related to the unequal educational
opportunities afforded them, resulting in high illiteracy and low voting participation. The Congress declares that, in order to enforce the guarantees of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, it is necessary
to eliminate such discrimination by prohibiting these practices, and by prescribing
other remedial devices.

42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(a).
16

See id.
Section 4(f) prohibits English-only materials and requires language assistance in
states and political subdivisions where (1) over 5% of the voting age citizens were, on
November 1, 1972, members of a language-minority group, (2) where registration and
election materials were provided only in English on that date, and (3) less than 50% of
the voting-age citizens were registered to vote or voted in the 1972 presidential election.
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(4); 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b). By using information from 1972, the
section focuses on areas with more serious histories of discrimination. Additionally, jurisdictions that satisfy the triggering formula must obtain preclearance of changes in election procedures under Section 5 of the Act, See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
18
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(b)(2)(A). Congress amended Section 203 in 1982 to require that a language-minority group also be limited-English-proficient in order to satisfy
17
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large numbers of language-minority voters who might not meet the 5% test in
many of the country’s largest population centers, Congress amended Section 203
in 1992 to impose an additional test, focusing on absolute numbers: a jurisdiction
with a language-minority group constituting a population with over 10,000 votingage limited-English-proficient citizens and possessing an illiteracy rate above the
national average is also covered.19
Although designed to be temporary measures, the language-assistance provisions of the act have been in place for over three decades and were extended in
2006 for an additional twenty-five years.20 Notwithstanding this history, recent
litigation and election monitoring by community-based organizations have illuminated ongoing problems of noncompliance with the act and its implementing regulations.21
Common problems have revolved around inadequate numbers of trained bilingual poll
workers, incomplete or insufficient amounts of translated election materials, and the failure
to develop translated materials for the Internet and other electronic media. Group-specific
issues such as transposing or incorrectly translating candidate names in Asian languages
such as Chinese or Korean, mistranslating ballot initiative and referendum language, and
establishing differential screening procedures for language-minority voters have also been
well documented.22
In addition, monitoring groups have chronicled numerous instances of voter intimidation, harassment, and discrimination (including the denial of ballots) against limitedEnglish-proficient voters in many areas covered by Section 4(f) and Section 203.23 Enforcement of Section 203 by the Justice Department has been inconsistent as well. As the
department’s Voting Rights Section itself has divulged, more litigation had been filed since

the statistical benchmark, which led to a reduction in the number of eligible jurisdictions.
See H.R. Rep. No. 102–655, at 7 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 766, 771.
19
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(b)(2)(A). The 1992 amendments also expanded Section
203’s coverage to include political subdivisions that contain all or any part of an Indian
reservation in which over 5% of the residents are members of a single language group,
are limited-English-proficient, and possess an illiteracy rate exceeding the national average. Id.
20
Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006).
President Bush signed the reauthorization bill into law on July 27, 2006.
21
Recent language minority litigation by the U.S. Justice Department is highlighted
at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/litigation/caselist.htm#sec203cases (last visited Sept.
13, 2006).
22
See National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium, Sound Barriers: Asian
Americans and Language Access in Election 2004 (2005); Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Asian American Access to Democracy in the 2004 Elections
(2005); Glenn D. Magpantay, Asian American Access to the Vote: The Language Assistance Provisions (Section 203) of the Voting Rights Act and Beyond, 11 ASIAN L. J. 31,
37–48 (2004).
23
Magpantay, supra note 22; Barry H. Weinberg & Lyn Utrecht, Problems in America’s Polling Places: How They Can Be Stopped, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 401,
410-15 (2002).
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May 2004 than had been filed in the prior eight years,24 which partly reflects the addition of
new jurisdictions and language groups following the decennial census of 2000, but no doubt
also reflects significant underenforcement of Section 203 in previous years.

B. The Structural Remediation Model and the Language-Assistance
Provisions
Like the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance requirement, Section 4(f) and Section 203
are predicated on congressional findings of past discrimination and are designed to create
structural remedies that are limited in time and scope. Consistent with their origins as

remedial devices, Section 4(f) and Section 203 restrict their coverage in a number
of important ways. First, the definition of “language minority” is limited to specific groups that Congress determined to have suffered significant discrimination
in education and in the political process. Only language groups whose members
are of Spanish heritage, American Indian, Asian American, or Alaska Native are
covered. Congress has chosen to omit limited-English-proficient voters from other
racial and ethnic groups from the act because discrimination against other groups
has not been as serious and has not resulted in comparably depressed levels of
political participation.25 Thus, limited-English-proficient voters whose primary
language is European (other than Spanish), African, Middle Eastern, or Caribbean
are not covered by the Voting Rights Act’s language-assistance mandates, group
population size or level of illiteracy notwithstanding.26
Second, the coverage mechanisms under Section 4(f) and Section 203 reflect
Congress’s employment of cost-benefit tradeoffs that limit assistance to the largest
language-minority populations. The right to receive governmental assistance in
one’s primary language is triggered only if one’s group size is substantial and can
justify the government’s expense of providing assistance. Surpassing either the 5%
benchmark or the numerical benchmark of 10,000 invokes Section 203’s language
assistance requirements and any attendant rights. However, no statutory right to
government-sponsored language assistance attaches—and thus none can be denied
through English-only procedures—if a voter is a member of a language-minority
group that is too small by congressional standards.27
24

http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_203/activ_203.htm#enforcement (last visited
Sept. 13, 2006).
25
See S. Rep. No. 94–295, at 31 (1975), reprinted at 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 798
(highlighting census data showing that political participation rates in the 1972 presidential election for voters of European origin greatly exceeded the rates for languageminority groups).
26
These groups can, however, be protected against violations of Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act on the basis of racial discrimination, and language assistance may be
an appropriate remedy to address the Section 2 violation.
27
Even with these various limitations, many states and political subdivisions are
covered by Section 4(f) and Section 203. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 55 & app. All of Alaska (for
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Third, Section 203’s illiteracy preconditions require a clear relationship between educational inequality and language assistance. Congress’s findings have
documented the links between discrimination in education, high levels of illiteracy, and depressed political participation. While a sizable language-minority
group may contain high numbers of adult immigrants who were educated abroad
and completed their education beyond the fifth-grade level, large numbers of the
same group might lack English literacy above the fifth-grade level, which can differ significantly from a figure based solely on grade completion. Thus a language
group might not satisfy the requirement that the group’s illiteracy rate exceed the
national rate, even though many voters might lack the necessary proficiency in
English to participate in the political process.28 The act’s illiteracy requirements
ignore this distinction and make the connection between past discrimination in
U.S.-based education and language-assistance remedies especially strong. The
language assistance provisions thus establish a remedial structure that is inherently
cabined and subject to cost-benefit balancing.

C. Alternative Enforcement Models: Section 2 and Section 208
The act offers additional protections to limited-English-proficient voters
through two other enforcement models: (1) the general antidiscrimination provision contained in Section 2 of the act and (2) the voting assistor of choice provision contained in Section 208 of the act. Both of these sections—applied in tandem with Section 203 claims—have been employed in recent Justice Department
litigation designed to promote language assistance in local jurisdictions. Neither
model, however, provides sufficient protections to limited-English-proficient voters to ensure widespread and meaningful access to the vote.

Alaskan Native languages), Arizona (for Spanish), and Texas (for Spanish) are covered
by Section 4(f), as are political subdivisions in seven states (for Spanish or American
Indian languages). Section 203’s coverage extends to jurisdictions in over thirty states,
with some covered for multiple language groups. For example, California’s Los Angeles
County must provide assistance to Spanish-speakers and five Asian-language groups
(Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese); Arizona’s Pima County must
provide assistance in Spanish and two American Indian languages (Yaqui and Tohono
O’Odham); and Alaska’s Lake and Peninsula Borough must provide assistance in Athabascan, Aleut, and Eskimo. See Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1992, Determinations
Under Section 203, 67 Fed. Reg. 48871 (July 26, 2002).
28
In the 1990s, for example, Korean-American voters in Los Angeles County, despite possessing over twice the population needed to satisfy the 10,000 numerical benchmark, did not qualify for language assistance because their illiteracy rate did not exceed
the national rate. See Magpantay, supra note 22, at 50. After the 2000 census, Korean
Americans were covered under Section 203 because census data revealed a group illiteracy rate above the national average. See Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1992, Determinations Under Section 203, 67 Fed. Reg. 48871 (July 26, 2002).

10

Angelo N. Ancheta

1.

Section 2 and the Traditional Antidiscrimination Model
By prohibiting policies that can result in a denial or abridgement of the right
to vote, Section 2 offers the most general scope of protection for language minorities under the Voting Rights Act. Like other federal antidiscrimination statutes
such as Title VI29 and Title VII30 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and their accompanying regulations, Section 2 applies nationwide, has no numerical trigger based
on group size, and requires a determination of either intentional discrimination or
discriminatory effects resulting from a challenged practice. Section 2 is unusual
among federal antidiscrimination laws, however, in that its protections beyond
race or color are circumscribed by the definition of language minorities; Section 2
is bound by the same definition that applies to Section 4(f) and Section 203.31 Section 2 is thus more explicit than other antidiscrimination laws in recognizing language minority discrimination, but individuals or groups who fall outside the protected language-minority classes cannot assert claims unless their allegations are
based on race or color.32
In practice, Section 2 litigation on behalf of language minority plaintiffs has
not typically focused on language-based discrimination. Most claims have involved vote dilution, such as challenges to discriminatory at-large election systems
or redistricting plans and have proceeded as if they were race-based claims. However, in United States v. City of Hamtramck, language assistance did play a central
role in the remedial portion of a consent decree involving racial discrimination.
The Hamtramck case revolved around race- and color-based claims brought on
behalf of Arab-American and darker-skinned Asian-American voters whose citizenship and voter qualifications were challenged by members of a private citizens
group during the November 1999 election in Hamtramck, Michigan—a problem
that local election officials did not address.33 In order to address voter intimidation
and harassment, the Hamtramck settlement required the training of officials on
appropriate procedures for challenging voters and on methods to address voter
intimidation. The consent decree went further and required that notices be prepared in English, Arabic, and Bengali to inform voters about the new practices and
that bilingual workers be hired to assist on election day. Language assistance thus
became a significant element of a remedy for Section 2 violations based on race
and color, but not on language discrimination per se.

29

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d- 2000d-4a.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
31
In Hernandez v. Woodard, 714 F.Supp. 963, 968–69 (N.D. Ill. 1989), a federal
district court found that Section 2 claims on behalf of language minorities need not be
coupled with Section 203’s statistical threshold (5%) in order to move forward.
32
Recent case law interpreting the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition on racial discrimination in voting to include ancestry-based classifications may provide support for a
broader interpretation of “race” under the Voting Rights Act. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano,
528 U.S. 495 (2000).
33
United States v. City of Hamtramck, No. 00–73541 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 7, 2000).
30
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Section 2 claims predicated on limited-English-proficiency are uncommon
and have only recently appeared in conjunction with section 203 enforcement actions by the Department of Justice.34 In United States v. City of Boston, for instance, the Justice Department alleged that the city had violated Section 203 by
failing to provide adequate Spanish-language assistance, but also alleged several
Section 2 violations involving Spanish speakers, as well as limited-Englishproficient Chinese-American and Vietnamese-American voters who had been
treated disrespectfully by election workers, had been ignored or improperly influenced in making ballot choices, and a Help America Vote Act violation that these
voters had been denied provisional ballots.35 The consent decree resolving the Boston case included a set of policies common in Section 203 settlement agreements—improved translations of materials, employment of a sufficient number of
bilingual poll workers, dissemination of multilingual information, federal monitoring, and the development of a language-assistance coordinator position and a
community-based advisory body. However, the Section 2 remedies were merged
with Section 203 mandates by requiring language assistance to all three groups,
even though only one group (Spanish speakers) was sufficiently large to be covered by Section 203.
The antidiscrimination model available under Section 2 is evolving and may
become a more significant source for language assistance, even when claims focus
on racial discrimination or on language-minority group membership independent
of actual language proficiency. Nevertheless, Section 2’s language-assistance jurisprudence remains underdeveloped, and Section 2 enforcement has inherent
limitations because it requires litigation and is tethered to the law’s remedial language assistance definitions.
2.

Section 208 and the Individual Accommodation Model
In 1982, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act by adding Section 208,
which states in part that “any voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of
blindness, disability, or inability to read or write may be given assistance by a person of the voter’s choice.”36 Although established primarily as an accommodation
measure for disabled and illiterate voters, Section 208 has been applied to limitedEnglish-proficient voters when those voters require assistance to understand an
English-only ballot. In formulating Section 208, Congress recognized that having
the assistance of a person of one’s own choice may be “the only way to assure
meaningful voting assistance and to avoid possible intimidation or manipulation of
34

See, e.g., United States v. City of Boston, No. 05-11598 WGY (D. Mass. Oct. 18,
2005) (three-judge court); United States v. Berks County, 277 F. Supp. 2d 570 (E.D. Pa.
2003).
35
United States v. City of Boston, No. 05–11598 WGY (D. Mass. Oct. 18, 2005)
(three-judge court).
36
42 U.S.C. 1973aa-6. Section 208 contains an exception precluding an assistor who
is “the voter’s employer or agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter’s union.” Id.
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the voter.”37 Section 208 applies nationwide and is not bound by the group definitions specified in the act’s remedial language assistance sections.
Although Section 208 imposes no affirmative obligations on state or local
governments to provide language assistance, it does create the basis for a Voting
Rights Act violation if election officials impede or deny a voter’s use of an assistor in order to vote. For example, in United States v. Berks County, a federal
district court found that barring Puerto Rican voters in Reading, Pennsylvania,
from bringing their assistors of choice into the voting booth reflected an extensive pattern of “hostile and unequal treatment of Hispanic and Spanish-speaking
voters by poll officials.”38 The court noted that when poll officials deny voters
the right to bring their assistor of choice into the voting booth, “voters feel uncomfortable with the process, do not understand the ballot, do not know how to
operate the voting machine, and cannot cast a meaningful vote.”39 The Berks
County court ordered multiple remedies, including the development of Spanishlanguage publicity and election materials and the training of poll workers on the
mandates of Section 208.
Similarly, in United States v. Miami-Dade County, Haitian-American voters
who needed assistance in Creole were denied the full and effective use of assistors of choice in the November 2000 presidential election.40 Poll workers denied
the use of assistors to many voters, and when assistance was allowed, it was
often limited to demonstrations of voting procedures outside the voting booth. A
consent decree required, among other things, new training programs for poll
workers, voter education policies, and the employment of bilingual election employees in targeted precincts. Despite falling outside the coverage of Section 4(f)
or Section 203, limited-English-proficient Haitian Creole speakers—like any
limited-English-proficient voters who need the help of an assistor—fell within
the protection of Section 208.
Section 208 typifies an accommodation model of civil rights enforcement
that is common in disability law, although Section 208 is a weak version that
imposes minimal obligations on government.41 Section 208 focuses on a legally
recognized trait or characteristic (blindness, disability, or the inability to read or
write in English) as well as the accompanying limitation in casting a meaningful
vote that arises from that trait or characteristic and requires a benefit or ser37

S. Rep. No 97–417, at 62 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 240–41.
Order, United States v. Berks County, No. 03-CV-1030 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2003),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_2/berks_order.htm (last visited Sept. 13,
2006).
39
Id.
40
See Consent Order, United States v. Miami-Dade County, No. 02-21698, (S.D.
Fla. June 17, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_2/miamidade_
cd.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2006).
41
For a general discussion of the differences between traditional antidiscrimination
law and disability accommodation law, see Pamela S. Karlan and George Rutherglen,
Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L. J. 1 (1996).
38
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vice—an accommodation—to help the voter overcome the limitation and gain
full access to the ballot. A violation of the statutory right occurs when the accommodation is denied.
Like other disability laws, Section 208 fosters highly specific and personalized assistance, since the voter determines who will provide the assistance and
what will be needed. However, the law imposes no standards on the quality of
the assistance provided to the voter, nor does it impose significant obligations on
government to ensure meaningful access to voting. The costs under Section 208
are borne almost entirely by the private assistor and the affected voter, who also
bears the responsibility of arranging the assistance. The primary costs that state
and local election officials assume are expenses relating to training staff to prevent violations of the law, such as interference with voters and their assistors.
Jurisdictions bear no costs in actually having to provide language assistance to
the limited-English-proficient voter.
Taken in combination, the remedial language assistance provisions in Sections 203 and 4(f), the antidiscrimination requirements of Section 2, and the
accommodation provision in Section 208 provide an array of potential enforcement tools, but form a network of laws with significant theoretical and practical
gaps. Section 4(f) and Section 203 offer structural remedies that do not require
individual findings of discrimination, but they are temporary and incomplete
remedies. Section 2 jurisprudence on language rights is inchoate and bound by a
definition of language-minority groups that is specific but underinclusive; moreover, claims must be litigated and language assistance does not necessarily follow as a remedy. Section 208 is arguably the broadest enforcement mechanism
for language assistance in the Voting Rights Act as it allows any limitedEnglish-proficient voter to have assistance in voting, but the responsibilities for
providing the accommodation fall largely on voters themselves, not on the government entities that administer elections.
The potential for weaving together the different Voting Rights Act provisions has found partial expression in recent litigation, however, and reconciling
the norms that underlie the various sections of the law can lead to a more effective model of voting rights enforcement. The next section attempts to reconcile
the strands of language rights enforcement under the act by offering a theory of
language accommodation drawing on antidiscrimination laws that focus on providing language assistance and meaningful access in a variety of settings.

II. From Remediation to Language Accommodation
While various provisions of the Voting Rights Act address languageaccommodation norms, Congress has not attempted to address the needs of limited-English-proficient voters in a systematic or integrated way. In its 2006 reauthorization of the remedial language assistance provisions for an additional
twenty-five years, Congress instituted only minor substantive amendments, focused primarily on the type of demographic data to be employed in determining
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coverage, and made no changes to the language-assistance triggering mechanisms or to the scope of coverage for language-minority groups.42 Formulating a
more coherent basis for language assistance is essential to ensure meaningful
access to the vote and to develop future voting rights enforcement strategies and
legislation.

A. Accommodation Norms in Theory and Practice
Although Section 4(f) and Section 203 are designed to be temporary measures
that address longstanding discrimination against particular groups, they contain the
seeds of a broader language-accommodation norm that has roots in both normative
legal theory and existing laws addressing discrimination on the basis of religion
and disability. Following from this norm is a legal regime that must recognize
significant differences and limitations affecting the ability to participate fully in
democratic life, imposes responsibilities and duties on appropriate actors to correct
these limitations (subject to some degree of balancing against exceptional costs
and hardships), and establishes civil rights causes of action when the duties are not
satisfied or are impeded.
1.

Accommodation and Democratic Participation
The question of providing language assistance to limited-English-proficient
voters falls within a set of larger debates about the role of languages other than
English in public life; civic unity and the assimilation of newcomers into American society; the responsibilities of government to its citizens and residents; and the
basic goals of antidiscrimination law.43 Outside of the voting rights context, there
have been significant public debates in recent years over the use of bilingual education in the public schools, as well as the mandating of English as the official
language of government, with initiatives and proposed statutes populating state
ballots and legislative agendas.44 The discord over language access and government-sponsored assistance has been particularly acute, because it has been tied to
42

Section 8 of H.R. 9 states: “Section 203(b)(2)(A) of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 (42 U.S.C. 1973aa-1a(b)(2)(A)) is amended by striking ‘census data’ and inserting
‘the 2010 American Community Survey census data and subsequent American Community Survey data in 5-year increments, or comparable census data.’” Fannie Lou Hamer,
Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–246, 120 Stat. 577 (July 26, 2006).
43
See Ronald Schmidt, Sr., LANGUAGE POLICY AND IDENTITY POLITICS IN THE
UNITED STATES (2000); LANGUAGE RIGHTS AND POLITICAL THEORY (Will Kymlicka and
Alan Patten eds., 2003).
44
See, e.g., Crystal Goodson Wilkerson, Comment, Patriotism or Prejudice: Alabama’s Official English Amendment, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 253 (2003–2004); William Ryan,
Note, The Unz Initiatives and the Abolition of Bilingual Education, 43 B.C. L. REV. 487
(2002).
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ongoing controversies over immigration policy and over linguistic and cultural
diversity in American society.
Within these larger debates, language assistance in voting has been especially
contentious because of conflicting views over the rights and responsibilities of
voters, particularly those who are naturalized citizens. There is little disagreement
that voting is essential for democratic governance and that discriminatory barriers
to participation in the political process should be eliminated. Yet the role of English in voting and the electoral process is subject to more heated dispute. Notwithstanding arguments criticizing the administrative and financial costs of providing
language assistance, many detractors of language assistance philosophically oppose attempts to diminish the role of English as a civic unifier and a political lingua franca. Many see language assistance as a deterrent to learning English and a
disruption to assimilation into American society. Indeed, opponents of language
assistance consider basic fluency in English to be a core element of American citizenship and point specifically to the requirements for naturalized citizenship,
which, except for cases involving long-term elderly residents, include minimal
literacy in English.45
On the other hand, support for language-assistance policies draws on fundamental values of democratic participation and political empowerment for all citizens, as well as the need to eliminate discrimination and barriers to participation,
including linguistic barriers.46 Arguments to make English proficiency a necessary
precondition for citizenship and voting have multiple flaws. While rudimentary
knowledge of English is a requirement for most of those seeking naturalized citizenship, the threshold for minimal English literacy required for naturalization falls
well below what is needed to fully understand a ballot, particularly one containing
complicated initiatives or referenda. Moreover, as Congress itself recognized in
passing the language assistance provisions in 1975, past and ongoing educational
discrimination that leads to low levels of literacy can affect both immigrants and
native-born citizens, including Puerto Ricans educated in Spanish-dominant
schools and Native Americans.47
45
8 U.S.C. § 1423. The naturalization laws create exceptions for citizenship applicants who are over the age of 50 and have resided in the United States as a lawful permanent resident for over 20 years, or are over the age of 55 and have resided in the U.S. for
over 15 years. These individuals need not demonstrate English literacy, but must still
fulfill other statutory requirements, including demonstrating knowledge of American
government and civics.
46
See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Accommodating Linguistic Difference: Toward a
Comprehensive Theory of Language Rights in the United States, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 133 (2001); Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language and Participation, 94 CAL. L. REV.
687 (2006).
47
In the case of Native Americans, maintenance of native languages is not only desirable, but strongly supported by federal policies. See Native American Languages Act
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–524, 106 Stat. 3434 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
2991b-3, 2992d(e) (2001)).
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Normative arguments for language rights and language pluralism thus suggest
that public policies should support multiple objectives that broaden democratic
participation, such as: prohibiting language discrimination; encouraging language
assistance and English-language education for the limited-English-proficient to
foster their incorporation into American society; and providing public support for
the use and retention of languages other than English, which is essential in an increasingly globalized society.48 Strong versions of these arguments propose that
both antidiscrimination law and social welfare policies should establish regimes
that recognize the right to use a language of one’s choice, that prohibit infringements on these rights, and that impose responsibilities to provide language assistance across various sectors. Although antidiscrimination policy is not a substitute
for social welfare policies or electoral policies that mandate language assistance
through budget appropriations, it can recognize sources of discrimination, like
English-only rules, and impose responsibilities to accommodate language needs
and address discrimination.
Consistent with these normative theories, language assistance within the voting rights arena—independent of remediation—can advance two important and
parallel goals: (1) promoting equality by preventing the subordination of limitedEnglish-proficient citizens who are unable to participate in the political process
because of language barriers, and (2) promoting civic engagement and political
participation by voters who might otherwise be deterred or unable to participate in
the political process without language assistance. These goals are fully complementary: empirical evidence on recent enforcement of the language assistance
provisions in Section 203 jurisdictions suggests that language-based remedies create incentives to greater democratic participation, leading to increased voter registration and voter turnout.49
If one accepts the premise that there are sufficiently strong interests in addressing subordination and promoting civic engagement for limited-Englishproficient voters to justify language assistance, the more difficult questions that
follow focus on the type of legal regime to impose and on the appropriate alloca48

See Schmidt, supra note 46, at 130–62 (comparing linguistic pluralism and assimilationism arguments).
49

See H.R. Rep. No. 109–478, at 20 (2006) (House Judiciary Committee Report finding “increases in language minority citizen registration and turnout rates
are most significant in jurisdictions that are in compliance with Section 203’s election assistance requirements” and reporting Justice Department data that “enforcement of Section 203 has resulted in ‘significantly narrowed gaps in electoral
participation. [For example, in] San Diego County, California, Spanish and Filipino registration are up over 21 percent and Vietnamese registration is up 37 percent.”); see also National Commission on the Voting Rights Act, Protecting Minority Voters: The Voting Rights Act at Work, 1982–2005, at 74–75, available at
http://www.votingrightsact.org/report/finalreport.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2006)
(summarizing recent increases in voter registration and turnout in Latino, Native
American, and Asian American communities).

Language Accommodation and the Voting Rights Act

17

tion of the resources and burdens that accompany language assistance. For instance, if a minimal goal is to provide an opportunity for voters to obtain some
measure of language assistance, Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act already provides the basis for voters to receive language assistance through private, personal
assistors, and a token allocation of public resources. On the other hand, a legal
regime that imposes governmental duties to provide language assistance to any
limited-English-proficient voter who needs it would entail significant public costs
and could generate thorny questions regarding the appropriate scope of a federal
antidiscrimination law compared to a public services or welfare policy.
Between the poles lies a norm that advances the equality and civic engagement interests, balances competing benefits and costs, and falls within the appropriate and constitutional scope of the Voting Rights Act. The next section examines the insights and limitations of existing antidiscrimination laws to help inform
this analysis.
2.

Accommodation in Antidiscrimination Law
Two sources of current antidiscrimination law are particularly useful in informing a language accommodation norm: (1) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and its attendant regulations and federal compliance guidelines, and (2) the
reasonable accommodation standards established under disability laws such as the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Although neither source of law provides
an ideal model for voting rights enforcement, they do provide normative support
for an overarching language accommodation norm and offer alternatives to the
fixed and bounded enforcement mechanisms contained in the Voting Rights Act’s
current language assistance provisions.
a. Title VI and Executive Order 13166
Title VI has an extensive history of administrative regulation and case law
addressing limited-English-proficiency. Title VI does not explicitly proscribe discrimination based on language use or limited English proficiency, but federal
agencies’ interpretations of the law have treated language-based discrimination as
a species of national origin discrimination. Linguistic characteristics are often
tightly woven with ethnicity and national origin, and a language-based policy can
have discriminatory effects on members of a national origin group; thus, Title VI
regulations and policy guidance typically prohibit language discrimination and
impose obligations on funding recipients to ensure that limited-English-proficient
individuals have meaningful access to federally funded programs.
In Lau v. Nichols,50 the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the linkage between
language and national origin discrimination when it concluded that the failure to
provide language assistance to non-English-speaking Chinese-American students
in the San Francisco Unified School District violated Title VI regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The federal regulations stated in part that “[w]here inability to speak and understand the English lan50

414 U.S. 563 (1974).
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guage excludes national origin-minority group children from effective participation in the educational program offered by a school district, the district must take
affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency in order to open its instructional program to these students.”51 Inherent in the Lau Court’s reasoning is the
recognition of a legally significant difference and a limitation based on that difference—the inability to understand English—that gives rise to a claim of discrimination if government does not take affirmative steps to address the problem. In
other words, there is a legally cognizable right that is violated if the government
does not make an accommodation.
President Clinton’s Executive Order 13166 (“Improving Access to Services
for Persons with Limited English Proficiency”), issued in 2000, establishes specific compliance standards that require agencies and recipients of federal funding
to ensure that limited-English-proficient individuals receive “meaningful access”
to federal programs and activities through appropriate assistance.52 Unlike the Voting Rights Act, the meaningful access guidelines of Executive Order 13166 do not
rely on a fixed triggering mechanism, but they do employ a metric in which group
size and interests are weighed against the costs of providing language-appropriate
services. The Department of Justice’s policy guidance document for the Executive
Order establishes compliance standards for federal agencies and funding recipients
that balance four factors: (1) the number or proportion of limited-Englishproficient persons to be served; (2) the frequency with which these individuals
come in contact with the program; (3) the nature and importance of the program or
service to people’s lives; and (4) the costs and resources available to the recipient.53
When justified, extensive interpreter services and written translations can be
provided, but in some instances, the balancing test may tip in favor of providing
very limited assistance—especially if the group is small, the interest is not
deemed important, and the costs significantly outweigh the benefits. For example, the guidelines for the Department of Health and Human Services (which
provides extensive funding for health care services) contemplates a “mix” of
services including on-site bilingual staff, commercial telephone translation services, family members or friends for oral interpretation, and complete, partial, or
summary translations in the case of written materials.54 In some instances, the
guidelines suggest that the benefits may justify only the most minimal assistance, particularly when the number of individuals needing language assistance
is small and the service is not vital.
The enforcement of language rights under laws such as Title VI can, however,
prove elusive. Recent case law has limited private rights of action under Title VI

51

See id. at 568 (quoting 35 Fed. Reg. 11595 (1970)).
Exec. Order 13166, reprinted in 65 Fed. Reg. 50121 (Aug. 11, 2000).
53
65 Fed. Reg. 50123, 50123–-25 (Aug. 16, 2000).
54
68 Fed. Reg. 47311, 47315–19 (Aug. 8, 2003).
52
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to claims of intentional discrimination,55 Executive Orders can be rescinded, and
policy guidance issued by federal agencies, which are hortatory and by themselves
do not carry the force of law, can be modified or repealed. Title VI and Executive
Order 13166 can be applied to voting, but even with the flow of federal funding to
state and local governments involved in election administration, they are not adequately utilized as enforcement tools. Government enforcement of Title VI and the
Executive Order against election officials has essentially fallen between the cracks
of agency responsibility: the Voting Rights Section of the Justice Department does
not currently enforce Title VI against state or local governments, and other sections of the federal government that address program access for limited-Englishproficient individuals do not enforce voting-related claims.
b. Reasonable Accommodations in Disability Law
The “reasonable accommodation” standard employed in disability law provides another source for informing a language-accommodation norm in voting
rights law.56 The standard is well-established in laws such as the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the regulations for the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. For
instance, under Title I of the ADA, illegal discrimination occurs when an employer fails to make reasonable accommodations for a disabled employee who can
perform the essential functions of a job.57 Examples of accommodations listed in
the ADA include “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or
policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations.”58
As Pamela Karlan and George Rutherglen have noted, the reasonable accommodation standard can be considered a species of antidiscrimination law distinct from the more common disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of
liability, because it represents a “difference” model, rather than the more customary “sameness” model that prohibits differentiation on the basis of a quality or
trait.59 A difference model “assumes that individuals who possess the quality or
55
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (concluding that there is no private
right of action to enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations).
56
The reasonable accommodation standard originated as a concept in employment
discrimination law involving religion. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1. Employers must provide
an accommodation for an employee’s religious observances or practices unless doing so
would create an undue hardship. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
(1977), the U.S. Supreme Court held that religious accommodations need only be made
when costs are small and that anything “more than a de minimis cost” would impose an
undue hardship. Id. at 84.
57
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
58
Id. § 12111(9)(A).
59
Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 44, at 10. But cf. Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001) (proposing strong similarities
between traditional antidiscrimination models and accommodation models).
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trait at issue are different in a relevant respect from individuals who don’t and that
treating them similarly can itself become a form of oppression.”60 Disability accommodations theory further suggests that conventional structures and practices in
the workplace and other settings are premised on what is perceived to be “normal”
and already accommodate the needs of nondisabled individuals. Providing a reasonable accommodation for a disabled individual thus should be considered neither “special” nor “extra,” but simply a way of removing an existing barrier and
stopping a different form of discrimination.61
In practice, though, employers are not required to make every possible accommodation requested, and it may be appropriate in some instances for the employee to bear some of the costs of the accommodation. Reasonable accommodation is thus a strongly individualized and case-specific standard in which disabled
individuals and covered entities negotiate the accommodation in order to balance
the interests of both the employee and the employer. Moreover, employers can
avoid the accommodation requirement altogether if they can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an “undue hardship,” which is an “action requiring
significant difficulty or expense,”62 based on weighing factors such as the cost of
the accommodation and the entity’s size and financial resources.63
Although only partly analogous, the barriers encountered by the limitedEnglish-proficient based on the “normal” nature of English language ballots and
election materials can function in the same way that barriers in the workplace limit
the employment opportunities of the physically or mentally disabled. The individual who is unable to comprehend fully an English-only ballot, but could exercise
an informed and effective vote if the election materials were available in the individual’s first language, is much like the disabled individual who is able to perform
the essential functions of a job, if accommodations such as equipment modifications or interpreter services are made available.64
60

Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 44, at 10 (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted).
61
Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RUTGERS L. J. 861, 890–93 (2004).
62
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A).
63
Id. § 12111(10)(B).
64
Indeed, the legislative history of Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act, which
covers blindness, disability, and illiteracy in a single sweep, captures some of the parallels between disability and limited English proficiency:
Certain discrete groups of citizens are unable to exercise their rights to vote without
obtaining assistance in voting including aid within the voting booth. These groups include the blind, the disabled, and those who either do not have a written language or who
are unable to read or write sufficiently well to understand the election material and the
ballot. Because of their need for assistance, members of these groups are more susceptible than the ordinary voter to having their vote unduly influenced or manipulated. As a
result, members of such groups run the risk that they will be discriminated against at the
polls and that their right to vote in state and federal elections will not be protected.
S. Rep. No 97–417, at 62 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 240.
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B. A Language Accommodation Norm
While it is possible to develop a voting rights model that tracks the meaningful access guidelines under Title VI or the reasonable accommodations standards
in disability law, an effective model for language accommodation in voting must
recognize both the similarities between voting rights and other antidiscrimination
guarantees and the differences that make voting a unique and vital element of a
democratic society. As a vehicle for promoting civic engagement and avenues for
political participation and empowerment, voting enjoys a venerated position in the
array of civil and political rights. The right to vote has been recognized as a fundamental right for purposes of equal protection review and is considered preservative of other basic civil and political rights.65 Balancing competing claims of government cost or “hardship” against access to the vote seem especially inapt when
basic franchise rights are at stake. Thus there are strong reasons for ensuring that
the right to vote—which includes exercising a meaningful vote in which ballots
and campaign issues are sufficiently understood—is preserved even more vigilantly than can be achieved through the standards of laws such as Title VI or the
ADA.
An ideal model of language accommodation in voting should encompass both
the “difference” principle of antidiscrimination law and incorporate the costbenefit analyses that inevitably arise with the imposition of responsibilities on
government. However, a model of voting rights protection should also militate
strongly against any infringement of the basic right to vote, even where the financial burden on government is significant. In other words, where “undue hardship”
in the voting context could create the functional equivalent of voter disenfranchisement, the balance should tip in favor of guaranteeing access to the vote. An
ideal model should revolve around three key elements: (1) difference recognition,
(2) appropriate accommodations, and (3) hardship boundaries.
1.

Difference Recognition
Recognizing that limited-English-proficiency constitutes a basis for discrimination and should be addressed through some type of language assistance is an
essential first step in creating and implementing a language-accommodation norm.
The current language-minority definitions of the Voting Rights Act reflect Congress’s determination in 1975 that language status can closely track race and color
as bases for discrimination in voting. The recognition of difference is thus inherent
in the creation of the language-minority category: Congress determined that limited-English-language proficiency, specifically among Latinos, Asian Americans,
and Native Americans, formed the basis for extensive voting discrimination. Section 4(f) and Section 203 are grounded in group differences involving Englishlanguage ability and literacy.

65
See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec., 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (the right to vote is fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny review under the equal protection clause).
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But the differences articulated in the limited definition of “language minority”
need not be the only ones that are recognized under the law. The current definitions, particularly when applied to general antidiscrimination provisions like Section 2, are both overinclusive and underinclusive of limited-English-proficient
voters.66 As analogues to race, the definitions cover a spectrum of speakers and
language communities ranging from monolingual English speakers to monolingual
speakers of languages other than English to those with varying degrees of bilingual ability.67 But not all language minority voters require assistance in order to
cast a meaningful and effective vote. The definitions are overinclusive because
they include voters who may suffer race-like discrimination because of status and
group membership, but are not necessarily limited-English-proficient. On the other
hand, the definitions are underinclusive of limited-English-proficient voters who
fall outside the enumerated groups for purposes of the act beyond remediation for
past discrimination; Arabic and Haitian Creole, languages that have been included
in recent litigation remedies, are just two examples of languages whose speakers
fall outside the formal definitions of a language minority.
When articulated as part of a structural remedy, the language-minority category need only include groups that Congress has found to have faced sufficient
discrimination. But if a difference principle focusing on language is to apply to the
general and permanent provisions of the act, then another type of definition needs
to be deployed. One method is through the category of “national origin,” which
has an established basis in equal protection jurisprudence and is well developed in
the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws such as Title VI. Language proficiency
is not directly implicated on the face of a national origin category, but agency
regulations and guidance that parallel existing guidelines found in Title VI and
Executive Order 13166 enforcement could ensure coverage. A second method is
through limited-English-proficiency per se, via a distinct antidiscrimination category that recognizes the barriers facing voters with limited English ability and an
independent definition, such as “voters who are limited-English-proficient” or
“voters who possess a language-based disability that limits their ability to meaningfully access the vote.” Although an antidiscrimination category based specifically on language proficiency may raise constitutional questions about the scope

66

To say that the language-minority definitions are both underinclusive and overinclusive does not make them constitutionally defective, however. Underinclusive legislation is constitutionally tolerable, since legislatures may choose to address one or limited
elements of a problem rather attack it comprehensively. See, e.g., Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). Overinclusiveness, in this instance, reflects
the dual nature of the language-minority definitions; as analogues to race, they are not
overinclusive at all, but with respect to the subset of individuals who are limited-Englishproficient, the category does not fit as tightly as a category such as “limited-Englishproficient language minorities.”
67
Rodríguez, ACCOMMODATING LINGUISTIC DIFFERENCE, supra note 49, at 142–43
(describing this as a “mutability continuum”).
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of congressional power (as discussed in Part III), it could provide more clarity to
the current definitions used in Section 2 and foster more fitting accommodations.
2.

Appropriate Accommodations
As a consequence of recognizing that language is a characteristic in which
treating differently situated people the same can itself constitute discrimination, a
language-accommodation norm must create mechanisms for both individual and
group access to the vote and must shift the costs of assistance away from the voter
alone. A weak form of individual accommodation already exists within the Voting
Rights Act under Section 208, while group-based accommodations are available
under the language assistance provisions of Section 4(f) and Section 203. But even
in combination these accommodations fall far short of an ideal regime. Section
208 imposes no checks on the quality of the assistance, nor does it impose any
responsibility on local officials to provide assistance. Sections 4(f) and 203 establish an accommodation system that is triggered by a combination of group definitions and statistical benchmarks, but like a light that is switched either on or off,
the structural remedy either requires full-scale remedies or none at all. The expansion of litigation remedies to subbenchmark populations, as well as voluntary efforts by local election officials to provide assistance to an increasing number of
language groups, demonstrate that accommodations need not be limited to populations that satisfy statistical triggers.
The Voting Rights Act could incorporate a wide range of accommodation
mechanisms beyond the status quo. For instance, an array of measures short of full
interpreter services and ballot translations could provide some measure of assistance to language-minority groups that fall below the statistical benchmarks of
Section 203. Allocating language-assistance resources could be based on inquiries
into the size and needs of language groups and the appropriate, cost-effective
mechanisms of assistance. When looking at groups whose size falls below the
Section 203 triggers, a sliding scale of interpreter services and written translations
could be developed based on group size, need, and the costs of hiring interpreters
and creating translations.
For example, a relatively small group, such as one containing between 2,500
and 5,000 voting-age citizens, might justify a reduced pool of interpreters who are
located only at key precincts or at a centralized location, along with more limited
number of translated materials and centralized distribution areas. A larger group,
but one still falling below the 10,000 benchmark, might require a larger deployment of interpreters and more widespread availability of translated written materials. The voter could bear some costs, such as transportation or accessing materials
through the Internet, while the government or government contractors would bear
others.
Moreover, if language-based differences are recognized as a basis for voting
discrimination, language accommodations can be incorporated into potential
remedies for violations of Section 2. The language-assistance remedies found in
recent Section 2 cases recognize that assistance mechanisms can be key components of make-whole remedies for past discrimination, even for smaller groups or
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groups that fall outside the formal definition of “language minority.” In City of
Boston, for example, the city agreed to provide an adequate supply of bilingual
poll workers and to disseminate bilingual information to Asian-American populations that fell below the triggers of Section 203; in Miami-Dade County, the remedies for Haitian Creole speakers included training programs for poll workers, voter
education policies, and the deployment of bilingual election employees in targeted
precincts. A nascent jurisprudence involving the act’s general antidiscrimination
provisions can turn to recent cases such as City of Boston and Miami-Dade County
to develop remedies that mandate governmental assistance and create incentives
for voters to employ personal assistors.
3.

Hardship Boundaries
Governmental resources to provide language assistance are not unlimited, so
costs and the concept of “hardship” must be taken into account for any language
accommodation standard. But because of the basic importance of voting in a democratic society, the cost-benefit calculus of a language-accommodation regime
must provide a baseline for language assistance that prevents the disenfranchisement of limited-English-proficient voters through competing claims of hardship by
local jurisdictions. Under the current mandates of Section 4(f) and Section 203, the
hardship calculation is built implicitly into the language of the statute: a jurisdiction with a language-minority population falling below the statistical benchmark
(5% or 10,000) necessarily incurs a hardship if it had to provide language assistance, because the costs of providing an accommodation to a population that is
smaller than the trigger would be excessive. But “hardship” within a broader norm
of language accommodation need not be defined or bounded solely by numbers.
The costs to government in providing interpreters and written materials are
not insignificant, but the burdens in addressing the needs of relatively small populations or populations outside the strict language-minority definitions need not be
onerous if an appropriate range of language-assistance mechanisms are in place.
Applying the same degree of language assistance to all limited-English-proficient
voters in a city or county that are applied to Section 203 groups could impose very
high costs on a jurisdiction, but measures short of deploying cadres of interpreters
and translating ballots into dozens of languages could be employed without serious hardship.
For example, even the smallest number of limited-English-proficient voters
can receive an accommodation by requiring jurisdictions to provide translated
notices that voters can use individual assistors pursuant to Section 208. The financial costs of such basic notices would be minimal if they entailed translating (1) a
small number of sentences and printing them on election materials designed for
the general populace, and (2) more extensive materials that are strategically targeted for distribution to the appropriate language group. Oral notices, particularly
for voters whose language has no written component, could be distributed via recorded public service announcements or to community organizations that work
closely with the relevant populations. With the basic right to vote at stake, mini-
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mally burdensome measures should be employed so that at least some accommodation exists for all limited-English-proficient voters in a jurisdiction.
Taken together, the difference recognition, appropriate accommodations, and
hardship boundaries of a language-accommodation norm are rooted in antidiscrimination law, drawing on theories and standards that are well established in
both the Voting Rights Act and related areas of law. As discussed in the next section, staying within the boundaries of antidiscrimination law is essential for offering language assistance through the Voting Rights Act and still staying within
recent constitutional constraints imposed upon Congress by the courts.

III. Implementing Language Accommodation
Implementing a language-accommodation norm within the Voting Rights Act
requires amendments to the current statute, as well as parallel developments in
administrative regulations and case law. This section discusses the constitutional
limitations on implementing a language-accommodation norm and suggests a
strategy that focuses on both amending the current language-assistance provisions and creating legislation to expand other areas of the law. It concludes with
recommendations for stronger enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

A. Constitutional Limitations
At first glance, the basic constitutionality of language assistance under the
Voting Rights Act would seem uncontroversial. Congressional exercises of power
to enforce the protections of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments via the act
have been almost entirely upheld as constitutional and have been used as judicial
benchmarks for comparing other legitimate exercises of congressional powers. In
South Carolina v. Katzenbach,68 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of major sections of the Voting Rights Act as consistent with Congress’s
powers to address discrimination pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment. In Katzenbach v. Morgan,69 the Court specifically upheld the constitutionality of using Section 4(e) to prohibit enforcement of a New York law that required English literacy
as a precondition for voting and that discriminated against limited-Englishspeaking Puerto Rican voters educated in Spanish-dominant schools. The Morgan
Court concluded that Congress had broad powers to ban literacy tests consistent
with both congressional findings of past discrimination and congressional interpretation of the equal protection clause.70 The court thus concluded that Section 4(e)
68
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was “a proper exercise of the powers granted to Congress by § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”71
However, congressional power over voting rights enforcement is not unlimited and was tempered in Oregon v. Mitchell, where a divided Court upheld several of the 1970 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, but struck down the section
of the act that lowered the minimum age in state and local elections from twentyone to eighteen as exceeding congressional powers.72 More recent case law outside
of the voting arena has further circumscribed Congress’s powers to breach state
sovereign immunity and to remedy discrimination pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, casting some doubt on Morgan’s vitality as a general
precedent.73 Moreover, the powers of Congress to address language-based discrimination per se, rather than as a species of racial and national origin discrimination, remain problematic because the status of language groups under the Fourteenth Amendment is poorly defined by Supreme Court case law. Each of these
constricting factors must be considered in developing any language accommodation regime.
1.

Congruence and Proportionality Requirements
Since the late 1990s, the Supreme Court’s “new federalism” jurisprudence has
imposed significant limits on congressional powers to create remedies against the
states in order to address discrimination. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court
distinguished legislation that is “remedial” and falls within the powers of Congress
under Section 5 and legislation that makes a “substantive change” in rights and
thus exceeds congressional powers.74 The Court stated: “Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the
power ‘to enforce,’ not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional
violation.”75 The Court further concluded that “[t]here must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
prohibited under the federal constitutional itself. Id. at 652–53; see Lassiter v. Northampton Elec. Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
71
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400 U.S. 112 (1970).
73
See generally Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance
Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L. J. 177
(2005); Michael E. Waterstone, Lane, Fundamental Rights, and Voting, 56 ALA. L. REV.
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adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and effect.”76
The congruence and proportionality test was further coupled with a heightened evidentiary standard in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett to require that Congress thoroughly document state discrimination against
a protected group in order to justify the piercing of sovereign immunity.77 The
Garrett Court held that Congress had exceeded its powers by authorizing individual lawsuits for damages against state governments for violations of Title I of the
ADA, which contains the ADA’s reasonable accommodation standards for employment. Arguing that because disability discrimination is not subject to heightened review under the equal protection clause, and because the ADA’s reasonable
accommodation mandate goes far beyond what the constitution requires, the
Garrett Court concluded that Congress’s response lacked proportionality and congruency. The majority found Congress’s legislative record on disability-based
discrimination by states to be insufficient; a pattern of widespread state discrimination against the disabled, going beyond the record of private discrimination,
would have been necessary to support a strong congressional remedy.
Some of the Court’s most recent cases have lessened Garrett’s evidentiary requirements, at least in cases involving gender discrimination and the fundamental
interest in gaining access to the courts, which are both subject to heightened review under the equal protection clause. In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,78 the Court upheld the authorization of lawsuits against states
under the Family Medical Leave Act, which entitles eligible employees to take up
to twelve weeks of unpaid annual leave from work for, among other things, serious health conditions affecting a spouse. The Hibbs Court did not insist on a
strong empirical basis for the contention that gender-role stereotyping and discrimination often occur through differential state employment policies, relying on
the fact that the Court had already recognized that gender should be subject to
heightened equal protection review. Similarly, in Tennessee v. Lane79 the Court
upheld congressional action authorizing lawsuits against states for violating Title
II of the ADA, which prohibits the exclusion of disabled individuals from public
services and programs, where the disabled plaintiff was denied the fundamental
right of access to courts.
The Court’s federalism jurisprudence continues to evolve, so there are no absolute answers to the question of whether a language accommodation regime
would necessarily satisfy the Court’s most recently developed standards. There
are, nevertheless, strong parallels between language assistance in voting and the
factual and legal predicates of Hibbs and Lane. Like access to the courts, the right
to vote is a fundamental interest that can invoke strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause. Moreover, both the courts and Congress have documented dis76
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crimination against members of language-minority groups, and national origin has
been squarely recognized as a suspect classification for equal protection purposes.
Hibbs itself also suggests that the Court is willing to accept weak versions of accommodations as proportional responses to equal protection violations. Requiring
employers to grant unpaid leave time is a mild form of accommodation designed
to shift some of the costs of family-related leaves to the employer.
In any case, any accommodation requirements that go beyond the existing requirements of the Voting Rights Act must be well supported by evidence of discrimination.80 In 2006, Congress compiled an extensive record to establish the
proportionality of its response in reauthorizing Sections 4(f) and 203. For instance,
the House Judiciary Committee’s report on H.R. 9 summarized several of its findings in this way:
The continued need for bilingual support is reflected by: (1) the increased number
of linguistically isolated households, particularly among Hispanic and Asian
American communities; (2) the increased number of language minority students
who are considered to be English language learners, such that students do not
speak English well enough to understand the required curriculum and require
supplemental classes; (3) the continued disparity in educational opportunities as
demonstrated by the disparate impact that budget shortfalls have on language minority citizens, and the continued need for litigation to protect English language
learners; and (4) the lack of available literacy centers and English as a Second
Language programs.81

This type of evidence, along with additional evidence on discrimination and
growing needs among limited-English-proficient voters outside the current language-minority groups, would lead many courts to uphold language mandates as
constitutional.82
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2.

Language as a Suspect Classification
Another key question is whether accommodations that create statutory rights
on the basis of language proficiency alone would satisfy constitutional requirements. As currently defined, the act’s language-minority category closely tracks
race and national origin; however, adding a new definition such as “discrimination
based on language proficiency” poses another set of questions regarding Congress’s expansion of the equal protection clause beyond its current constellation of
rights. The Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence regarding language
status, untethered from race or national origin, is not well developed, and the
Court has never held that limited-English-proficiency alone is a suspect classification deserving heightened scrutiny.83
Unlike agency regulations that have enunciated a connection between language and disparate impacts on national origin groups, the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has been nearly silent on the relationship between language and
national origin. While the Supreme Court has struck down bans on the use of languages other than English as violating due process,84 it has had little to say about
protections for limited-English-proficient individuals. In Hernandez v. New York,
the Supreme Court’s only modern case addressing language-based discrimination
under the equal protection clause, the Court upheld the use of peremptory strikes
by prosecutors who argued that they had struck potential jurors in a jury venire
based on their bilingualism and their potential inability to listen and follow a court
interpreter, not on race or national origin.85 Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in
Hernandez rejected a connection between bilingual ability and race under the specific facts of the case, but he did make clear that language could in some instances
serve as proxy for race:
Just as shared language can serve to foster community, language differences can
be a source of division. Language elicits a response from others, ranging from
admiration and respect, to distance and alienation, to ridicule and scorn. Reactions
of the latter type all too often result from or initiate racial hostility. . . . It may well
83
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be, for certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that proficiency in a particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an
equal protection analysis.86

Without a square holding that limited-English-proficiency forms the basis for
a suspect classification, a language-accommodation measure must either be coupled analytically with race or national origin or it must be evaluated through the
lens of rationality review, which implies that the City of Boerne/Garrett line of
cases may constrain the remedies and accommodations developed on the basis of
limited-English-proficiency. This is not to say that Congress cannot prohibit discrimination on the basis of English proficiency; the legislative response must be
proportional, and the Court’s more searching review of antidiscrimination laws
based on the nonsuspect classes of age87 and disability suggests that there may be
comparable restrictions on congressional measures addressing language discrimination. Consequently, a safer course to help ensure the constitutionality of an accommodations measure under the Voting Rights Act may be to rely on a group
definition such as national origin, which rests on solid constitutional ground as a
suspect classification, and to employ administrative regulations to help cement the
relationship between limited-English-proficiency and national origin discrimination.

B. Enforcing Accommodations Norms
In recent years, there has not been a groundswell of legislative activity to
expand language rights, and it would be naive to ignore the political opposition
to subsidizing governmental language assistance of any kind, whether in the
voting arena or in areas such as education and social services. Indeed, the depth
of the controversies over language assistance crystallized in 2006 during the
House of Representatives’ floor debates on H.R. 9, which reauthorized Sections
4(f) and 203 for an additional twenty-five years. An amendment offered by Representative Steve King would have eliminated the act’s language assistance provisions, but was defeated by a 238–185 vote—an indication that current opposition to language assistance measures is well beyond token. Given present-day
political constraints, a pragmatic strategy for legislative change could focus on
modest changes to the language-assistance provisions, documented by adequate
86
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research and evidence of ongoing discrimination against language groups, as
well as changes to the permanent provisions of the act and its implementing
regulations.
Amending Section 4(f) and Section 203. As discussed above, the languageassistance provisions offer no safety net for language-minority voters whose numbers fall below the statistical triggers. Lowering numerical thresholds to a figure
such as 7,500 offers a useful amendment that could lead to coverage of more jurisdictions and more voters, but it would still replicate a model that offers no protections for subtrigger populations. A more flexible, sliding scale approach would
offer a preferable regime—not as a substitute, but as an adjunct to a threshold
mechanism that requires full accommodations for large-enough language-minority
groups in a jurisdiction. Subtrigger groups could be ordered by categories—for
example, (A) 9,999–7,500, (B) 7,499–5,000, (C) 4,999–2,500, and (D) 2,499 or
below—and appropriate accommodations, such as partial or targeted language
assistance, could be deployed with each category. For purposes of structural remediation, the basic definitions of the language-minority groups do not have to be
amended, except to reflect Congress’s addition of groups that have been shown to
have suffered comparable levels of discrimination in education and the political
process.
Section 2 and Regulatory Enforcement. The permanent provisions of the Voting Rights Act raise a different set of issues, particularly with the Supreme Court’s
recent cases posing limits on the creation of accommodations that might exceed
congressional powers. The language minority definition in Section 2, drawn from
the act’s remedial provisions, creates race-like categories to address status-based
discrimination, but it does not adequately address language proficiency as a distinct source of voting discrimination. Adding “national origin” as a basis for illegal
discrimination would remove the limits imposed by the current definitions and
allow the importation of administrative standards from other federal civil rights
laws.
Along with an amendment to the statute, regulations comparable to the Title
VI and Executive Order 13166 agency mandates would add greater clarity to Section 2’s general prohibition on discrimination and provide additional support for
litigation remedies. Without duplicating the requirements under Section 203 and
Section 4(f), regulations could focus on mandates and recommendations that cover
all limited-English-speaking voters in a jurisdiction and do not require that illiteracy levels for language groups exceed the national average. A regulatory scheme
could also include mechanisms for jurisdictions to provide notices of the Section
208 assistor provisions to all voters in their ballot materials and to translate notices
based on cost-benefit calculations. This is an example of a minimally intrusive
requirement that should conform to constitutional limits.
Applying Title VI to Voting Rights. Title VI and Executive 13166 Order offer
statutory and regulatory bases for developing flexible language-accommodation
measures. Although private rights of action to enforce Title VI’s disparate impact
regulations can no longer be initiated because of recent Supreme Court case law,
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agency action is still available to enforce the regulations.88 The Department of
Justice can enforce these regulations and guidelines directly, while various federal
agencies can attach requirements through their funding programs, including the
payments and grants in support of the Help America Vote Act, which offers substantial federal dollars for improvements to state and local election systems.89
Election Assistance Laws. Given the constitutional limitations on congressional remedies under the antidiscrimination laws, election laws such the Help
America Vote Act that are predicated on federal funding offer additional mechanisms to enforce language-accommodation norms. HAVA itself offers a system of
government payments and grants that allows language measures to be incorporated into states’ voting system improvements and technological innovations. The
law already contains provisions for payments to the states for “[i]mproving the
accessibility and quantity of polling places, including providing physical access
for individuals with disabilities, providing nonvisual access for individuals with
visual impairments, and providing assistance to Native Americans, Alaska Native
citizens, and to individuals with limited proficiency in the English language.”90
Moreover, HAVA requires that voting systems for federal elections must “provide
alternative language accessibility pursuant to the requirements of section 203 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.”91
Although still viewed with some skepticism and still presenting security and
accessibility problems, new technologies such as direct record electronic voting
systems do have the potential to lower the costs and burdens imposed upon government to implement written translations. The lack of appropriations to support
the HAVA mandates has been a major stumbling block to developing voting systems with strong language accommodations.92 But HAVA and other election assistance laws based on congressional appropriations still have the potential to provide
greater access to limited-English-proficient voters, as well as the advantage of
bypassing the strictures of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on congressional
enforcement by being attached to Congress’s spending powers, rather than Congress’s powers pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.

Conclusion
When Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1975 to recognize discrimination against language minorities, it created powerful mechanisms to ensure the
right to vote and to increase the participation of minority voters. Yet, the guaran88
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tees have been uncertain and often incomplete. The current law has limitations,
and the proposed model of language accommodation attempts to improve the
statute and its implementation and to place the Voting Rights Act in greater
alignment with other federal antidiscrimination laws. But implementing a small
yet important set of changes in a single law must also be supported by a broader
norm that acknowledges the linguistic diversity of the United States and an overriding goal of increasing civic engagement and electoral participation by all
Americans. An antidiscrimination policy is not a substitute for an agenda that
also includes public policies under which both language assistance and Englishlanguage learning are integrated into public services and the educational system.
The proposed model is simply one step in advancing that agenda.

